In an elegant synthesis of behavior, modeling, and neurophysiology, Crapse et al. (2018) show that neurons of the superior colliculus influence choice behavior by encoding choice criterion, a quantitative measure of decision bias integral to signal detection theory.
Decision-making research seeks to understand choice at two levels: an algorithmic level, which describes computations that transform sensory evidence into action, and the implementation level, which identifies the neural circuits that perform this transformation. Ideally, this is done by measuring choice behavior in a well-constrained paradigm, creating a quantitative model that captures key choice parameters and then mapping these parameters to neural circuits (Krakauer et al., 2017) . In this issue of Neuron, Crapse et al. (2018) provide a superb example of this synthesis, using a novel decision-making paradigm to show how a quantitative measure of choice bias is embodied in a subcortical circuit that controls motor output. Specifically, they show how neurons of the superior colliculus (SC) represent choice criterion, one of the key parameters of signal detection theory.
Commonly used in decision making and psychophysics, signal detection theory explains binary decisions made under uncertainty (Green and Swets, 1966) . Imagine, for example, a physician listening to a patient's chest to determine the presence or absence of an abnormal heart murmur. In detection theory, such judgements are parameterized by two independent variables: ''sensitivity'' and ''criterion'' (also called ''bias''). Sensitivity describes how well a signal can be distinguished from noise, for example, the doctor's overall skill in distinguishing abnormal from normal heart sounds. In contrast, criterion describes the predisposition toward making one choice or the other-the tendency to declare patients sick or well.
Detection theory models are relatively simple and can account for behavior in many different choice paradigms; however, the mapping of detection theory parameters to specific neural circuits is still incomplete. In particular, very little is known about the neural basis of choice criterion, and it is here that Crapse et al.
(2018) make a major advance. The first step was the creation of a behavioral task for macaque monkeys designed to manipulate criterion while leaving sensitivity unchanged. Monkeys viewed moving dots on a display and were asked whether the dot motion was totally random (''no'' response) or contained vertical motion among a fraction of the dots (''yes'' response). The proportion of vertically moving dots varied from trial to trial, and the monkeys' choices generally reflected this variable: they usually chose ''no'' when the motion was totally random, usually chose ''yes'' when all motion was vertical, and in between these extremes made more ''yes'' choices as the fraction of vertical motion increased. To report their choices, the monkeys made an eye movement (saccade) toward a green target for ''yes'' and a red target for ''no.'' The green and red targets were placed on the left and right sides of the visual field center, and their locations were randomly switched from one trial to the next. As will become apparent, this randomization was critical because it dissociated the decision process (random versus vertical) from the physical performance of the choice report (left versus right saccade).
In detection theory terms, sensitivity captures how well the monkeys distinguished vertical from random motion, and criterion describes the bias for selecting ''yes'' or ''no.'' To manipulate criterion, Crapse et al. (2018) used a priming procedure to shift the monkeys' expectation of observing a vertical motion trial. Each session began with a 50/50 mixture of random and vertical motion trials. Then, the mixture was suddenly changed to either 85% random trials (conservative priming) or 85% vertical motion trials (liberal). Finally, the original 50/50 mixture was restored. The choice criterion values in the initial and final blocks (both 50/50) were then compared to determine whether the monkeys adapted their perceptual judgements to conform to the conditions of the priming trials-just as a doctor might be more likely to judge a patient sick after encountering many sick patients in a row. As predicted, monkeys were more likely to make a ''no'' response following conservative priming (increased criterion) but were more likely to indicate ''yes'' following liberal priming (decreased criterion). Critically, this choice adaptation was entirely accounted for by changes in the criterion parameter, with no change in sensitivity on average.
This behavioral dissociation is crucial because it means that priming-induced neural changes are attributable to only one variable. The search for neural correlates of this variable focused on the SC, a laminated, bilateral structure in the dorsal midbrain. The SC is recognized for its role in orienting eye movements, as it contains neurons that fire prior to saccades and projects to the oculomotor brainstem. It is also retinotopically organized, such that neurons at a given location in the SC have saccadic response fields; that is, they fire the most for saccades of a particular direction and amplitude, and stimulation of these cells will produce saccades of that same vector (Wurtz and Albano, 1980) . In addition to this role, however, the SC is implicated in a broad array of cognitive functions, including target selection, visual perception, covert attention, and decision making (Basso and May, 2017; Horwitz and Newsome, 1999; Krauzlis et al., 2013) . It is these higher-level integrative functions that make the SC a prime target for understanding the neural basis of decision making.
Of particular interest are the so-called ''prelude'' neurons, cells that gradually build up or ramp down their activity in the moments leading up to a saccade; this buildup (in SC and elsewhere) has been thought to reflect the computations underlying saccadic decisions. A key advance of this study is to assess SC prelude activity under conditions where decision criterion is manipulated in isolation from sensitivity.
While the monkeys made choices, Crapse et al. (2018) recorded single SC neurons. To maximize prelude activity, one choice target was always placed in the center of the recorded neuron's response field (RF) and the other in the opposite visual hemifield. Consistent with prior reports, cells typically increased firing before saccades to the target in the RF and decreased for saccades to the opposite target. However, prelude activity was also modulated by the fraction of vertical motion in the stimulus, showing that these neurons do not simply encode motor plans, but process information integral to the decision process.
The key insight into these computations was made by exploiting the dissociation between the decision (''yes''/''no'') and the choice report (left/right saccade), which stems from the random assignment of red and green target locations in every trial. For every condition in the task, they computed how prelude activity differed in trials with a ''yes'' versus a ''no'' target in the RF. For example, consider the trials with a 50% fraction of vertical motion in which the monkey correctly chooses ''yes''; the RF contains the green ''yes'' target in half these trials and the red ''no'' in the other half. Even though the behavioral outcome was the same (''yes'' choice), the difference between ''yes-in-RF'' and ''no-in-RF'' trials revealed the strength of the neural activity that lead to that choice (i.e., the degree of opposition among the SC neurons governing the two choice RFs). A large difference means that one choice option was strongly favored, and a small difference means the two options were favored more evenly.
With this estimate of choice encoding strength, Crapse et al. (2018) then examined the effects of behavioral priming. Liberal priming increased differential ''yes-no'' activity, meaning that SC cells signaled a stronger distinction between ''yes'' and ''no'' choices for a given choice at given level of evidence. In contrast, conservative priming did the opposite, decreasing the neural distinction between ''yes'' and ''no'' choices.
Because choice criterion was the only behavioral variable that changed, it suggests that the neural changes reflect shifts in criterion and not other variables. This was confirmed by extending criterion and sensitivity calculations into the neural data: just as behavioral criteria and sensitivity are calculated using the proportion of ''yes'' and ''no'' responses, the neural analogs of these are calculated by treating differential ''yes-no'' activity as akin to a neural ''vote'' in a given condition. Just like the behavioral parameters, liberal priming decreased neural criterion, conservative priming increased it, and, crucially, neither manipulation changed neural sensitivity. Furthermore, the neural and behavioral criterion changes were correlated at the session level, whereas there was no correlation between sensitivity measures. Thus, priming-induced changes in SC activity reflected the manipulation of the behavioral choice criterion.
The neural data also afforded the opportunity to test an important alternative model, in which the SC encodes accumulated evidence in the form of a decision variable (DV). DV-based models are compatible with detection theory and make identical predictions about choice behavior; furthermore, prelude activity in SC and elsewhere has often been likened to DV dynamics (Ratcliff et al., 2007; Roitman and Shadlen, 2002) . A natural question, therefore, is asked whether a DVbased model provides an equal or better account of SC activity than detection theory. Here, the answer was clear: a DV-based model predicted ''yes-no'' encoding strength changes that were the opposite of those actually observed, demonstrating the superiority of detection theory in this paradigm.
While the evidence above is correlational, it points to causal hypothesis: as the ''yes-no'' encoding strength increases, behavioral criterion decreases, yielding more liberal (''yes'') choices; and as this encoding strength decreases, behavioral criterion increases, yielding more conservative (''no'') choices. In their final experiment, Crapse et al. (2018) deployed a sharp test of this hypothesis by directly manipulating SC activity, a test made possible by the physiology of the SC and the elegant design of the task. Recall that individual SC cells preferentially encode specific saccade vectors (RFs). By stimulating cells whose RF contains one of the choice targets, it is possible to increase the activity pertaining to one choice target alone, and because the choice target is randomly assigned as green or red on every trial, it is possible to selectively increase activity pertaining to ''yes'' or ''no'' choices.
Thus, according to the hypothesis above, stimulation on trials when a ''yes'' target is in the RF should increase differential encoding of ''yes'' versus ''no'' targets and decrease behavioral criterion, mimicking the effects of liberal priming, and stimulation on ''no'' trials should decrease differential encoding and increase behavioral criterion, similar to conservative priming. Indeed, this is precisely what was found. Importantly, the stimulation strength was always far below the threshold for evoking saccades, so the effects were not simply due to the overriding of oculomotor commands with strong stimulation.
While the stimulation effects support a causal role for SC in determining behavioral criterion, a surprising additional result suggests this role is more subtle and potentially more important. Stimulation was always performed in a sessionwise manner: some sessions were devoted to only ''yes'' trial stimulation and others to only ''no'' trials. Within a session, stimulation was randomly applied to only half of the eligible trials, so that behavior on un-stimulated trials could serve as a within-session control. However, in both liberal and conservative sessions, the choices on non-stimulated trials exhibited the same criterion shifts seen on stimulated trials. In other words, stimulation effects carried over into subsequent non-stimulation trials in the same session. This surprising finding points to a nuanced, multifaceted role for the SC: it not only reflects choice criterion computations, but may also set the criterion in a manner that persists at least on the scale of a few trials.
With these findings, there now appears to be a rough framework for dissociating the neural basis of detection theory parameters: while choice sensitivity may rely on neocortical sensory encoding (Luo and Maunsell, 2015) , choice criterion may rely on subcortical circuits, including the SC. Though tentative, this broad hypothesis will serve as a clear guide for future studies. The results also raise several new questions. For example, is the criterion signal in SC inherited from upstream structures, or is it computed locally, perhaps relying on cross-hemisphere communication? Also, which specific SC output pathways are important for setting behavioral criterion following stimulation? Outputs from SC are widespread, spanning from the diencephalon down to the midbrain, providing numerous means by which SC activity could influence criterion calculations or associated plasticity mechanisms.
In summary, Crapse et al. (2018) make a compelling case for the role of SC in decision making: behavioral manipulations of the choice criterion induce parallel changes in choice representations in SC, and physiological manipulations of SC induce parallel changes in choice criterion. Furthermore, the behavioral and neural data are unified under the same well-understood model, facilitating a clear mapping between algorithmic-and implementational-level accounts of choice behavior. This depth of understanding is the ideal in systems and behavioral neuroscience, and this paper in as an exemplar of how it can be achieved.
Human lateral PPC demonstrates rich, functional heterogeneity across its subregions, including during mnemonic and numerical decision tasks. In this issue of Neuron, Rutishauser et al. (2018) report striking local heterogeneity within a small patch of anterior IPS at the neuronal level during memory-based decisions.
The human lateral posterior parietal cortex (PPC)-inclusive of the superior parietal lobule (SPL), intraparietal sulcus region (IPS), angular gyrus (AG), and supramarginal gyrus (SMG) (Figure 1A) , i.e., a substantial proportion of human neocortex-is engaged in a large variety of cognitive tasks, such as spatial attention, perceptual decision making, visual categorization, and saccadic eye movements (Hyv€ arinen, 2012) . Data over the past two decades indicate that PPC functions also contribute to two other cognitive domains: episodic memory (Wagner et al., 2005) and numerical cognition (Nieder and Dehaene, 2009) . In each of these domains, there is evidence that specific subregions of PPC demonstrate distinct functional responses, pointing to a multi-component model of PPC functional organization. For example, extensive fMRI data from recognition memory tasks ( Figure 1B) indicate that the bloodoxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal in (1) lateral IPS monotonically increases with the perceived strength that a test probe is old, being weakest when the
